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1 
A NEXT STEP IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: ENSURING THE 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER THE FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 
APRIL G. DAWSON* 
ABSTRACT 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act into law.  Notwithstanding the current constitutional 
challenges to the law, this historic legislation reaffirmed the basic principle 
that everyone should be afforded the opportunity to have security when it 
comes to health care.  Such security also includes security in employment 
when a serious health condition causes an employee to be out of work for a 
temporary period of time.  Indeed, it was the recognition of the need for job 
security during a time of illness which led Congress to enact the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in 1993, providing eligible employees twelve 
workweeks of leave each year to allow an employee to care for a spouse, child 
or parent facing a serious health condition or when the employee is battling his 
or her own serious health condition. 
However, when the Department of Labor (“DOL”) amended FMLA 
regulations in November 2008 to allow employers to secure unsupervised 
waivers of employees’ FMLA rights, it severely undercut job security afforded 
employees under the Act.  The DOL’s amendment weakens the intended 
protection of the Act by providing employers with the ability to easily avoid 
responsibility for FMLA violations, which in turn facilitates the removal of 
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employees who should be protected under the FMLA.  This Article argues that 
employees should only choose to waive their FMLA rights after being fully 
and adequately informed about what their rights are and that this can only be 
accomplished through supervised waivers.  This Article further advocates for 
executive and legislative action to revise the law, and proposes litigation 
strategies for effectively challenging FMLA waivers under the current 
regulatory scheme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Tuesday, March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the historic 
health care reform bill making the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
the law of the land.1  During the signing ceremony, the President stated that 
with this new law, the government had enshrined “the core principle that 
everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their health 
care.”2  Security when it comes to health care also includes security in 
employment when a serious health condition causes an employee to be out of 
work for a temporary period of time.  It was this recognition for the need for 
job security which led Congress, after years of effort by advocates for federal 
sick leave legislation, to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA”).3  The FMLA provides eligible employees twelve workweeks of 
leave each year to allow the employee to care for a child following the birth, 
adoption, or foster care placement of the child; “to care for the spouse, or a 
son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or 
parent has a serious health condition”; and to allow an employee to receive 
treatment “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee 
unable to perform the functions of the [employee’s] position.”4  Employers 
may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to 
exercise, any right provided [by the Act].”5  Nor may employers discriminate 
or retaliate against an employee for exercising his or her FMLA rights.6 
An issue that received recent attention was whether FMLA rights were 
waivable absent court or the Department of Labor (“DOL”) approval.  The 
question was whether FMLA rights should be treated like Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”)7 rights and waivable only with approval by a court or the DOL, 
or whether FMLA rights should be treated like Title VII8 rights and waivable 
without approval by the court or the overseeing administrative agency.  At the 
center of this debate was the 1995 FMLA regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), 
which provided in part that “[e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers 
induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA.”9 
 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and it’s Official, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19. 
 2. Stolberg & Pear, supra note 1. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006)). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
 5. Id. § 2615(a)(1). 
 6. Id. § 2615(a)(2). 
 7. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 9. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (1995). The full text of the original 1995 provision of 
825.220(d), which was effective until January 15, 2009, is as follows: 
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Only two circuit courts—the Fifth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit—directly 
addressed the issue and interpreted the regulation, and they reached opposite 
conclusions.  The Fifth Circuit held in Faris v. Williams WPC–1, Inc. that 
section 825.220(d) only bars the prospective (future) waiver of substantive 
rights and not the retrospective (after the fact) release of claims.10  The Fourth 
Circuit held in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. that section 825.220(d) 
prohibits both the prospective and retrospective waiver of FMLA rights and 
claims unless the waiver is approved by the DOL or a court.11  The United 
States Supreme Court declined to hear Taylor.12  The Supreme Court’s 
decision to deny certiorari was most likely based on the Solicitor General’s 
recommendation that the Court deny certiorari because the DOL had taken 
steps to amend section 825.220(d).13 
As the Solicitor General indicated in its brief, the DOL, on November 17, 
2008, issued a final rule amending section 825.220(d) to read: “Employees 
cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their 
prospective rights under FMLA.”14  The DOL further amended the regulation 
 
(d) Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights 
under FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining representatives) 
cannot “trade off” the right to take FMLA leave against some other benefit offered by the 
employer. This does not prevent an employee’s voluntary and uncoerced acceptance (not 
as a condition of employment) of a “light duty” assignment while recovering from a 
serious health condition (see §825.702(d)). In such a circumstance the employee’s right to 
restoration to the same or an equivalent position is available until 12 weeks have passed 
within the 12-month period, including all FMLA leave taken and the period of “light 
duty.” 
 10. 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 11. 493 F.3d 454, 463 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 12. Progress Energy, Inc., v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (mem.). 
 13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Progress Energy, Inc., v. Taylor, 128 
S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (No. 07-539), 2008 WL 2095733. 
 14. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2009) (emphasis added).  The full text of the amended provision 
of section 825.220(d), which became January 16, 2009, is as follows: 
(d) Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their 
prospective rights under FMLA.  For example, employees (or their collective bargaining 
representatives) cannot “trade off” the right to take FMLA leave against some other 
benefit offered by the employer.  This does not prevent the settlement or release of FMLA 
claims by employees based on past employer conduct without the approval of the 
Department of Labor or a court.  Nor does it prevent an employee’s voluntary and 
uncoerced acceptance (not as a condition of employment) of a ‘‘light duty’’ assignment 
while recovering from a serious health condition (see §825.702(d)).  An employee’s 
acceptance of such ‘‘light duty’’ assignment does not constitute a waiver of the 
employee’s prospective rights, including the right to be restored to the same position the 
employee held at the time the employee’s FMLA leave commenced or to an equivalent 
position. The employee’s right to restoration, however, ceases at the end of the applicable 
12-month FMLA leave year. 
Id. 
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to explicitly state that section 825.220(d) “does not prevent the settlement or 
release of FMLA claims by employees based on past employer conduct 
without the approval of the Department of Labor or a court.”15  The 
amendment to section 825.220(d) became effective January 16, 2009.16 
Now, approximately two years after the amendment allowing unsupervised 
waivers of FMLA claims, it appears that the DOL’s rule has threatened the job 
security of employees requiring leave under the FMLA.  As will be discussed, 
the lack of oversight of the FMLA waiver process allows employers to easily 
circumvent the requirements of the FMLA and avoid responsibility for 
violations of the Act.  This weakening of the FMLA is even more 
disconcerting given the current state of massive job losses.  The increase in the 
number of mass layoffs and the reaffirmation that Americans deserve security 
when it comes to health care issues demand a reexamination of the effects of 
the DOL’s amendment to section 825.220(d).  Part I of this Article provides an 
overview of the enactment of the FMLA and the promulgation and judicial 
interpretation of section 825.220(d).  Part II examines the rules governing the 
waiver of rights under the other federal employment statutes.  Part III argues 
that the purpose and uniqueness of the FMLA support a requirement that 
FMLA waivers be approved before being valid.  Finally, Part IV argues for 
executive and legislative action to revise the law and proposes litigation 
strategies for effectively challenging FMLA waivers under the current 
regulatory scheme. 
I.  FMLA 
A. Enactment and Statutory Provisions 
The FMLA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1993, 
following years of congressional debates and two vetoes by President George 
H.W. Bush.17  Congress enacted the FMLA after finding, inter alia, that “the 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Effectiveness of Information Collection 
Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 2862, 2863 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
 17. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006); Statement on Signing the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 1 PUB. PAPERS 50 (Feb. 5, 1993).  The Family Medical 
Leave Act of 1990, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. (1990), was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush on 
June 29, 1990.  Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1990, 1 PUB. PAPERS 890 (June 29, 1990).  On July 25, 1990 the 
House of Representatives failed to obtain the necessary votes to override a Presidential Veto, 
obtaining only 232 of the needed 285 votes (2/3 of House of Representatives membership).  136 
CONG. REC. 19,142–43 (1990).  Two years later a similar bill, The Family Medical Leave Act of 
1992, S.5, 102nd Cong. (1992), was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush on September 22, 
1992.  Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1625 (Sept. 22, 1992).  The Senate obtained the required votes to override 
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lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can force 
individuals to choose between job security and parenting; [and that] there is 
inadequate job security for employees who have serious health conditions that 
prevent them from working for temporary periods.”18  Thus, the FMLA was 
designed “to set a minimum labor standard for family and medical leave.”19 
Under the FMLA, an “eligible” employee20 of a “covered” employer21 is 
entitled to twelve weeks of leave for one or more of the following: 
(A) . . . the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for 
such son or daughter[;] 
(B) . . . the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or 
foster care[;] 
(C) [i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the 
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health 
condition[;] 
(D) [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 
perform the functions of the position of such employee.22 
 
the Presidential Veto (obtaining 68 votes when 66 were required).  138 CONG. REC. 27,513 
(1992).  However, on September 30, 1992, the House of Representatives failed to obtain the 
necessary votes to override the Presidential Veto, obtaining only 258 of the needed 285 votes (2/3 
of House of Representatives membership).  138 CONG. REC. 29,140 (1992). 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3)–(4) (2006). 
 19. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. (Taylor I), 415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 20. Employees are eligible if they have worked for a covered employer for at least 12 
months and worked 1250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the start of 
the leave.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (2010). 
 21. The FMLA applies to all private employers engaged in any industry affecting commerce 
with 50 or more employees who work 20 or more calendar workweeks within a 75-mile radius.  
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.111. The FMLA also applies to all public 
employers and all public and private schools are covered by the FMLA without regard to the 
number of employees employed.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.108(d). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a).  Additionally, on January 28, 2008, 
President Bush signed into law H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008 (“NDAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3.  Among other things, the NDAA added 
a fifth reason for leave that allows an employee to twelve (12) weeks of leave for 
any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary [of Labor] shall, by regulation, determine) 
arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on 
active duty (or has been notified of an impending call or order to active duty) in the 
Armed Forces in support of a contingency operation. 
Id. § 585(a)(2)(A), 122 Stat. at 129 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(E)). 
  The NDAA also amended the FMLA to permit a “spouse, son, daughter, parent, or next 
of kin” to take up to 26 workweeks of leave to care for a “member of the Armed Forces, 
including a member of the National Guard or Reserves, who is undergoing medical treatment, 
recuperation, or therapy, is otherwise in outpatient status, or is otherwise on the temporary 
disability retired list, for a serious injury or illness.”  Id. § 585(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 128 (codified at 
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The FMLA provides three categories of rights—substantive, proscriptive, 
and remedial.23  The substantive rights include an employee’s right to receive 
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for a qualifying situation24 and the right to 
reinstatement following the leave.25  Other substantive rights include the 
continuation of employment benefits,26 the maintenance of the employee’s 
group health coverage,27 and the availability of intermittent leave.28  
Additionally, “employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative 
factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary 
actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under ‘no fault’ attendance 
policies.”29  Congress made it unlawful for an employer to “interfere with, 
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided 
[by the Act].”30 
The proscriptive rights include an employee’s right not to be discriminated 
against or retaliated against for exercising FMLA rights.31  The FMLA also 
provides employees with remedial rights, which provide employees with a 
private right of action to recover both equitable relief and money damages 
against an employer who interferes with an employee’s exercise of any rights 
under the Act, or discriminates or retaliates against an employee’s exercise of 
any rights under the Act.32 
B. Promulgation of Section 825.220(d) 
Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Labor to prescribe the 
regulations necessary to administer the FMLA.33  As required under the notice-
 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(15)); id. § 585(a)(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 129 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(3)).  
This provision became effective January 28, 2008. 
 23. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. (Taylor II), 493 F.3d 454, 457 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006). 
 25. Id. § 2614(a)(1). 
 26. Id. § 2614(a)(2). 
 27. Id. § 2614(c)(1). 
 28. Id. § 2612(b)(1). 
 29. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2010). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); see also Babcock v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., 348 F.3d 
73, 76 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that an employee may recover damages or equitable relief when 
such interference, restraint, or denial of FMLA rights occurs). 
 31. Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454, 457 (4th Cir. 2007); see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see also 
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing the elements necessary to 
assert a violation of § 2615(a) due to retaliation). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1)–(2), 2617(a)(1)–(2); Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 457; see also Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003) (noting the FMLA’s creation of “a 
private right of action to seek both equitable relief and money damages”). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 2654.  The Secretary designated the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor’s Employment Standards Administration as the agency responsible for 
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and-comment section of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),34 the 
Secretary published a request for comments on issues to be addressed in 
drafting the regulations for the FMLA.35  On June 4, 1993, the Secretary 
published interim regulations for the FMLA, along with comments as to how 
the regulations had been formulated.36  In addition to publishing the interim 
regulations, the Secretary made a request for additional comments before the 
final regulations were scheduled to take effect.37 
One of the interim regulations was section 825.220(d), which provided in 
part that “[e]mployees cannot waive their rights under FMLA . . . . [and] 
[e]mployers are prohibited from inducing an employee to waive rights under 
the Act.”38  Some employers expressed concerns with section 825.220(d) and 
“recommended explicit allowance of waivers and releases in connection with 
settlement of FMLA claims and as part of a severance package (as allowed 
under Title VII and ADEA claims, for example).”39  Rejecting the employers’ 
recommendation, the DOL stated that it 
ha[d] given careful consideration to the comments received on this section and 
ha[d] concluded that prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and 
employers inducing employees to waive their rights constitute sound public 
policy under the FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards statutes 
such as the FLSA.40 
The final regulations varied little from the interim regulations,41 and the final 
version of section 825.220(d) was identical to the interim version.42 
C. Judicial Interpretation of Section 825.220(d) 
The first reported case applying and thus interpreting section 825.220(d) 
was Bluitt v. Eval Co. of America.43  Bluitt involved an employee who was 
terminated by her employer after she failed to report to work because of 
 
administering and enforcing the FMLA.  Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 13,394 (Mar. 10, 1993). 
 34. 5 U.S.C § 553(b) (2006) (stating that “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be 
published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally 
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law”). 
 35. Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. at 13,394. 
 36. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (June 4, 1993). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 31,825–26. 
 39. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Compare, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (1993), with 60 Fed. Reg. at 2244, and 58 Fed. 
Reg. at 31,817. 
 42. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (1993), with 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,825. 
 43. 3 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
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alleged serious health problems.44  The employee subsequently filed an FMLA 
action against her employer asserting that her employer violated the FMLA 
because she was not advised of her rights under the FMLA prior to her 
termination.45  The employee had signed a “Settlement Agreement and General 
Release” related to an entirely separate action approximately two weeks after 
her termination.46  When the employee filed the FMLA action, the employer 
argued that the employee had waived her rights when she signed the settlement 
agreement and general release.47  The court concluded, however, that section 
825.220(d) precluded waiver of the employee’s FMLA claim.48 
Four years later, the second published opinion addressing section 
825.220(d) was issued in the case of Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp.49  
Dierlam involved an employee who filed an FMLA action against her former 
employer because the employer reduced her bonus based on the employee’s 
twelve-week leave for adoption of a child.50  Prior to filing the lawsuit, the 
employee completed her term with the employer and upon leaving the 
company the employee signed a Separation Agreement and General Release.51  
Like the court in Bluitt, the Dierlam court concluded that section 825.220(d) 
precluded waiver of the employee’s claim despite the all inclusive language of 
the general release.52 
Although there was little judicial attention initially given to section 
825.220(d) following its promulgation, beginning in 2003, a year after the 
Dierlam decision, a number of courts addressed the meaning of section 
825.220(d) and often reached different results. 
1. Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc. 
The first court to closely analyze section 825.220(d) was the Fifth Circuit 
in the case of Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc.53  Faris involved an employee 
who maintained that she was terminated in retaliation for asserting her FMLA 
rights.54  Prior to filing her lawsuit, Faris had signed a release, which did not 
specifically mention the FMLA, but provided that Faris was waiving her rights 
to “all other claims arising under any other federal, state or local law or 
 
 44. Id. at 762. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Bluitt, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 764. 
 49. 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 50. Id. at 1054. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1056. 
 53. 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 54. Id. at 318. 
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regulation.”55  Thus, the only issue to be resolved by the Fifth Circuit was 
whether section 825.220(d) prohibits the waiver of an employee’s right to 
bring a retaliation claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).56 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by discussing whether the term 
“employee” in section 825.220(d) referred to only current employees.57  While 
the Fifth Circuit concluded that there were strong indications that the term 
“employee” refers only to current employees, it declined to reach that issue.58 
The Fifth Circuit next addressed the employer’s argument “that the 
regulation extends only to ‘substantive rights’ under the FMLA, rather than to 
post-dispute causes of action for retaliation.”59  The court began its analysis by 
distinguishing between the substantive rights and the right to be free from 
retaliation.60  The court then concluded that the term “rights under the law” in 
the regulation was in reference to only the substantive rights.61  The court 
specifically noted that “[t]he cause of action for discrimination, however, is 
never described as an FMLA right itself, within the regulation or elsewhere.”62  
The court, having distinguished FMLA substantive rights and FMLA 
proscriptive rights (which include the right to be free from retaliation), 
concluded that the phrase “rights under FMLA” as used in section 825.220(d) 
was in reference to the substantive FMLA rights only and did not incorporate 
proscriptive or retaliation rights.63  Based on this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit 
held the regulation did not prohibit Faris from waiving her proscriptive rights, 
and thus concluded that the release signed by Faris barred her from bringing 
her retaliation claim.64 
The court, however, did not end its analysis with the distinction between 
the prescriptive (substantive) and proscriptive (retaliation) rights under the 
FMLA.  After making the substantive-retaliation distinction and stating that 
“[s]everal factors support the interpretation that this regulation applies only to 
waiver of substantive rights under the statute, such as rights to leave, 
reinstatement, etc., rather than to a cause of action for retaliation for the 
exercise of those rights,”65 the court concluded without clear explanation or 
analysis that section 825.220(d) prohibits only the prospective waiver of 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 320–21. 
 57. Id. at 320. 
 58. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 320–21. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 321 (emphasis added). 
 63. Faris, 332 F.3d at 322. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 320 (emphasis added). 
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substantive rights.66  However, that language is arguably mere dictum because 
that issue was not before the court or the basis for the court’s conclusion that 
the regulation did not prevent Faris from waiving her rights to bring a 
retaliation claim. 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, notwithstanding the fact that 
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that section 825.220(d) prohibits only the 
prospective waiver of substantive rights is dicta, the DOL nevertheless adopted 
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that section 825.220(d) only prohibits the 
prospective waiver of rights.67 
2. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. (Taylor I) 
Two years after the Fifth Circuit issued the Faris decision, the Fourth 
Circuit in 2005 interpreted section 825.220(d) in Taylor v. Progress Energy, 
Inc. (“Taylor I”).68  Taylor involved an employee who claimed that she was 
misinformed of her FMLA rights, improperly denied FMLA-qualifying leave, 
had her FMLA-qualifying leave counted against her in raise determinations, 
had her FMLA-qualifying leave counted against her in her performance 
evaluation, and was selected for termination in a reduction in force as a result 
of her improper performance evaluation and in retaliation for attempting to 
exercise her FMLA rights.69  Taylor was required to sign a severance 
agreement and a general release to receive her severance benefits.70  The 
release did not specifically mention the FMLA, but included language which 
stated that the employee was waiving “claims . . . arising under . . . any other 
federal, state or local law.”71  Taylor thereafter filed suit alleging a number of 
FMLA violations.72  In response to the employer’s argument that Taylor 
waived her rights when she signed the general release, Taylor argued that 29 
C.F.R. § 825.220(d) prohibits the waiver of Taylor’s FMLA rights through the 
signing of the general release.73  The trial court disagreed, adopted the 
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit decision in Faris,74 and held that section 
825.220(d) only bars the prospective (future) waiver of substantive rights and 
 
 66. Id. at 321. 
 67. However, the DOL later disagreed with the Fifth Circuit that the phrase “rights under 
FMLA” as used in 825.220(d) is limited to only substantive rights.  See Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454, 
458 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 68. 415 F.3d 364, 365 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 69. Id. at 366–68. 
 70. Id. at 367. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 367–68. 
 73. Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 368. 
 74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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not the retrospective (after the fact) release of claims.75  On appeal, a 
unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the release signed 
by Taylor was not enforceable with regard to her FMLA claims because, based 
on the plain language of the regulation, section 825.220(d) prohibits both the 
prospective and retrospective waiver of FMLA rights and claims, unless the 
waiver is approved by the DOL or a court.76 
The Fourth Circuit later granted the employer’s petition for rehearing and 
allowed the DOL to file an amicus brief and present oral arguments in support 
of the employer’s position that section 825.220(d) only prohibits prospective, 
but not retrospective, waiver of rights.  The court then went on to issue the 
Taylor II decision.77 
3. Taylor v. Progress Energy (Taylor II) 
Following rehearing, a now divided panel of the Fourth Circuit again held 
that section 825.220(d) prohibits the waiver of all of FMLA rights (substantive, 
proscriptive, and remedial) and is not limited to only prospective waivers of 
these rights.78  Looking to the plain language of the regulation, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the phrase “rights under FMLA” includes no 
limitations regarding the specific rights under the FMLA and includes no 
 
 75. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 7:03-CV-73-H(1), 2004 WL 5576902, at *5 
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2004). 
 76. Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 375. 
 77. In between Taylor I and Taylor II, two district courts addressed the issue of the meaning 
of 825.220(d).  In July 2006, the United States District Court for Oregon in Brizzee v. Fred Meyer 
Stores, Inc. followed the Fourth Circuit and held that an employee may not waive their rights 
under the FMLA without approval from a court or the DOL.  No. CV04-1566-ST, 2006 WL 
2045857, at *11 (D. Or. July 17, 2006).  The court stated that it was “more persuaded by the 
thorough analysis and reasoning of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Taylor.”  Id.  The court 
reaffirmed its position in 2008.  Brizzee v. Fred  Meyer Stores, Inc., No. CV 04-1566-ST, 2008 
WL 426510, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 2008) (“This court has carefully reviewed the arguments for 
the opposing positions and remains persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s analysis.”). 
  Then in August of that same year, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania in Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA (Dougherty I) addressed the 
issue.  No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006).  The court initially agreed with 
the Fourth Circuit in Taylor I and held that section 825.220(d) prohibited employees from 
waiving their FMLA rights.  Id. at *6.  However, the court granted the employer’s motion for 
reconsideration and in a decision dated April 9, 2007 (after the Fourth Circuit granted rehearing 
in Taylor, but before the Fourth Circuit decided and issued its opinion in Taylor II) the Dougherty 
court vacated its earlier order and held “[s]ection 825.220(d) does not prohibit an employee from 
waiving past FMLA claims as part of a severance agreement or settlement.”  Dougherty v. Teva 
Pharm. USA (Dougherty II), No. 05-2336, 2007 WL 1165068, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).  
On February 20, 2008, following the Fourth Circuit’s Taylor II decision, discussed in detail 
below, the court reaffirmed its holding in Dougherty II.  Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA 
(Dougherty III), No. 05-CV-2336, 2008 WL 508011, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2008). 
 78. Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454, 463 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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limitations regarding prospective or retrospective waivers.79  The court further 
noted that there is nothing in the plain language that limits the waiver 
prohibition to only prospective waivers.80  The court also noted that there is 
nothing in the plain language that would suggest that the phrase “rights under 
FMLA” does not include remedial rights—the right of action provided under 
section 2617(a)(2).81 
The court also concluded that the DOL’s proffered interpretation was 
inconsistent with the regulation and should therefore be rejected.82  The court 
also concluded that the DOL’s current interpretation was inconsistent with the 
Department’s position at the time the regulation was promulgated in 1995.83  
The court noted that the DOL specifically considered and rejected a proposed 
amendment that would have excluded severance agreement waivers (generally 
retrospective waivers) from the waiver prohibition in section 220(d).84  
Rejecting the request to change the provision, the DOL explained that it had 
carefully considered the comments on section 220(d) and “concluded that 
prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and employers inducing 
employees to waive their rights constitute sound public policy under the 
FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards statutes such as the 
FLSA.”85 
The panel reinstated its opinion in Taylor I, and reaffirmed its conclusion 
that “without prior DOL or court approval, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) bars the 
prospective and retrospective waiver or release of rights under the FMLA, 
including the right to bring an action or claim for a violation of the Act.”86  The 
dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the language of 
section 825.220(d) was clear and unambiguous and argued that, under Auer v. 
Robbins,87 deference should be given to the DOL’s interpretation of its own 
 
 79. Id. at 456–57. 
 80. Id. at 458.  Despite the DOL’s claim that section 220(d) only prohibits the prospective 
waiver of substantive rights, the regulation’s plain language controls when a regulation is clear 
and unambiguous.  Id.; see Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“To defer to 
the agency’s position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, 
to create de facto a new regulation.”). 
 81. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 457. 
 82. Id. at 461. 
 83. Id. at 461–62. 
 84. Id. at 461; see Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 
1995). 
 85. 60 Fed. Reg. at 2218. 
 86. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 463. 
 87. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
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regulation.88  The United States Supreme Court denied the Petition for 
Certiorari filed on behalf of the employer in Taylor.89 
D. Amendment of Section 825.220(d) 
Prior to the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of section 825.220(d), the DOL 
was silent regarding the meaning of that regulatory provision.  However, 
following the Fourth Circuit’s July 2005 decision in Taylor I, the DOL issued a 
Request for Information (“RFI”) on December 1, 2006, requesting information 
regarding, inter alia, employees’ waiver of FMLA rights pursuant to section 
825.220(d).90  This was the first indication that the DOL was reviewing and 
considering taking formal steps to amend the regulation.  After the Fourth 
Circuit decided Taylor II in July 2007, wherein it reiterated its holding in 
Taylor I that section 825.220(d) required supervised waivers of FMLA claims, 
the DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking which included a proposed 
amendment to section 825.220(d).91  Following the Court’s denial of certiorari, 
the DOL issued a final rule on November 17, 2008, amending section 
825.220(d).92  With the amendment, which became effective January 16, 2009, 
the DOL modified the regulation to explicitly state that section 825.220(d) 
“does not prevent the settlement or release of FMLA claims by employees 
 
 88. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 464 (Duncan, J., dissenting). 
 89. Progress Energy, Inc. v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (mem.).  At the request of the 
Court, the United States Solicitor General filed an invitation brief addressing the issue of review.  
Although the Solicitor General argued that the Fourth Circuit erred in rejecting the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of section 825.220(d), he nevertheless recommended that the Court deny 
certiorari because the DOL had proposed a new regulation that would clarify the issue of 
employees waiving their FMLA rights.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, 
Progress Energy, Inc. v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008), 493 F.3d 316 (2007) (No. 07-539), 2008 
WL 2095733. 
 90. Request for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg. 
69,504, 69,509–10 (Dec. 1, 2006). 
 91.  The DOL stated: 
The Department proposes to clarify the language in paragraph (d) in light of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Taylor which held that employees cannot voluntarily settle their past 
FMLA claims.  The Department disagrees with that reading of the regulations.  As the 
example in the current regulations reveals, this provision was intended to apply only to 
the waiver of prospective rights.   In the interest of clarity, however, the Department 
proposes to make explicit in paragraph (d) that employees and employers should be 
permitted to voluntarily agree to the settlement of past claims without having to first 
obtain the permission or approval of the Department or a court.  The Department does not 
believe this is a change in the law as it has never been the Department’s practice, since the 
enactment of the FMLA, to supervise such voluntary settlements. 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876, 7901 (Feb. 11, 2008). 
 92. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
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based on past employer conduct without the approval of the Department of 
Labor or a court.”93 
When the DOL issued the final rule amending section 825.220(d), the 
agency maintained that its amendment did not change the regulation, but 
merely clarified the meaning of the provision.94  Indeed, the DOL has 
maintained since filing its amicus curiae brief in Taylor II (the first time the 
DOL commented on the waiver provision of section 825.220(d)) that the 
phrase “waiver of rights” in section 825.220(d) refers to only prospective 
waiver of rights. 
Despite the DOL’s claim that it has always viewed the language in section 
825.220(d)—”an employee may not waive his rights”—as only applying to 
prospective waivers,95 it bears noting that in previous litigation the DOL 
clearly viewed the phrase “waiver of rights” as relating to the waiver of 
retrospective claims.  In Niland v. Delta Recycling Corp.96 the DOL filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of the employer, wherein the Secretary uses the 
phrase “waiver of [Appellant’s] rights” to refer to the settlement of claims 
arising from past violations of employment laws.97  Niland was a case wherein 
 
 93. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2009). 
 94. The DOL stated: 
Because of the perceived ambiguity in the 1995 regulation, the Department now clarifies 
that it intends, as it has always intended, for the waiver prohibition to apply only to 
prospective FMLA rights.  The Department notes that it intended under the proposal to 
allow employees to enter severance agreements releasing FMLA claims based on past 
employer conduct, in addition to allowing settlement of FMLA claims in situations where 
the employee has filed a claim against the employer.  The Department has never 
interpreted the waiver provision as applying to the settlement of claims or to the release of 
FMLA claims in severance agreements based on past employer conduct, whether known 
or unknown to the employee at the time of entering the severance agreement.  In the 
interest of further clarity, the Department has modified the language in the final rule.  By 
changing the language from settling past FMLA claims to settling or releasing FMLA 
claims based on past conduct by the employer, the Department intends to make clear that 
an employee may waive his or her FMLA claims based on past conduct by the employer, 
whether such claims are filed or not filed, or known or unknown to the employee as of the 
date of signing the settlement or the severance agreement.  Thus, an employee may sign a 
severance agreement with his or her employer releasing the employer from all FMLA 
claims based on past conduct by the employer.  An employee may also settle an FMLA 
claim against his or her employer without Department or court approval.  The Department 
believes this promotes the efficient resolution of FMLA claims and recognizes the 
common practice of including a release of a broad array of employment claims in 
severance agreements. 
73 Fed. Reg. at 67,987–88. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 97. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in support of Defendant-Appellee 
Delta Recycling Corp. Supporting Affirmance of the District Court at 22, Niland, 377 F.3d 1244 
(No. 03-14553), 2004 WL 2445519 [hereinafter Secretary of Labor Niland Brief]. 
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the employer, Delta Recycling Corp., discovered that it did not pay current and 
former employees overtime in accordance with the FLSA.98  The DOL and 
Delta entered into a Compliance Partnership Agreement to resolve the issue.99  
In part, the Compliance Partnership Agreement required Delta to conduct a 
self-audit to determine overtime wage liability.100  In addition, the agreement 
required the DOL to supervise the payment of any back wages and allowed 
Delta to use waiver language set forth in DOL Form WH–58 (“Receipt of 
Payment of Wages”).101  Delta sent a check for back wages to the plaintiff with 
a letter indicating that the acceptance of the check constituted a waiver of legal 
claims.102  The plaintiff eventually cashed the check and later sued Delta in the 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking back overtime wages 
under the FLSA.103  Delta moved for summary judgment, which was 
granted.104  The plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
In its amicus curiae brief arguing for affirmance of the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment, the Secretary of Labor argued that the employee 
“waived his right to bring a private action” under the FLSA for the employer’s 
past violation of the FLSA because the DOL supervised the payment of unpaid 
wages and the employee signed a DOL-approved receipt form specifically 
advising the employee that acceptance of such payment would constitute a 
waiver of his rights under the FLSA.105  The Secretary’s entire discussion of 
the phrase “waiver of rights” centered on the alleged retrospective waiver and 
settlement of FLSA rights and claims, and the employee’s waiver of his right 
to bring a private action.106  The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the DOL and 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment.107  Thus, it is difficult to reconcile 
the DOL’s current interpretation of the phrase “waiver of rights” with its view 
of the phrase in Niland.  Moreover, the DOL’s view in Niland that the phrase 
“waiver of rights” speaks to past violation of claims is consistent with 
Congress’ use of the phrase108 and the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase.109 
 
 98. Niland, 377 F.3d at 1245–46. 
 99. Id. at 1246. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Niland, 377 F.3d at 1246. 
 104. Id. at 1247. 
 105. Secretary of Labor Niland Brief, supra note 97, at 13, 16–17. 
 106. Id. at 13. 
 107. Niland, 377 F.3d at 1248. 
 108. Congress uses the phrase “waiver of rights” in the context of retrospective waiver of 
FLSA rights or claims.  In section 216(c), Congress authorizes the DOL to 
supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime 
compensation owing to any employee or employees . . . , and the agreement of any 
employee to accept such payment shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such 
employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid 
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Finally, the DOL’s claim that the regulation only related to prospective 
waiver of claims would render the regulation superfluous and thus unnecessary 
because the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1974, almost twenty years before 
the enactment of the FMLA, that “there can be no prospective waiver of an 
employee’s rights under Title VII.”110  Thus, contrary to its assertion, the DOL 
did more than simply clarify the regulation, but in fact significantly changed 
the meaning of section 825.220(d).  However, notwithstanding the arguments 
regarding the substance of the DOL’s amendment, the end result is, be it 
through clarification or outright modification of section 825.220(d), that 
employers may secure unapproved waivers of FMLA rights from their 
employees. 
Proponents of unsupervised FMLA waivers argue that the amendment 
ensures that FMLA rights are being treated like the majority of the other 
federally created employment rights, which may be waived without approval 
 
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as 
liquidated damages. 
29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2006) (emphasis added).  When Congress added the waiver provision found 
in section 216(c) in 1949, it did so to encourage employers who had already violated employees’ 
rights under the FLSA to voluntary settle employees’ claims under the supervision of the DOL.  
See Sneed v. Sneed’s Shipbuilding, Inc., 545 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1977).  Thus, when 
Congress states in section 216(c) that acceptance of the settlement by an employee constitutes “a 
waiver . . . of any right . . . under [the FLSA],” Congress is referring to the retrospective waiver 
of rights or settlement of claims. 
 109. The United States Supreme Court’s rationale in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 
U.S. 697 (1945)—the case in which this Court created a judicial prohibition against waivers of an 
employee’s rights under the FLSA—also supports the conclusion that the phrase “waiver of 
rights” as used in the FMLA regulation includes retrospective waivers.  The specific issue 
addressed by the Court with respect to two of the consolidated cases was “whether an employee 
subject to the terms of the [FLSA] can waive or release his right to receive from his employer 
liquidated damages under Section 16(b).”  Id. at 699.  After stating the general proposition that “a 
statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or 
released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy,” id. at 704, the Court 
concluded that the “attempted release and waiver of rights under the Act [through the signing of 
the release] was absolutely void,”  id. at 714.  The Court recognized that by having the employees 
execute a release, the employer was attempting to effectuate a retrospective waiver of the 
employee’s rights under the FLSA.  See id. at 707–08. 
 110. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).  Interpreting the regulation in 
the manner suggested by the DOL would go against the classic canon of statutory construction 
that courts must avoid any interpretation that would render a regulation superfluous.  See, e.g., 
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, 
no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))); Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“It is a classic canon of statutory construction that courts must ‘give effect to every provision and 
word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or 
superfluous.’” (quoting United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 366 (4th Cir. 2003))). 
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from the overseeing agency or the courts.111  However, as demonstrated below, 
there are significant differences between the FMLA and the other federal 
employment statutes and rights that warrant approval of FMLA waivers before 
they are valid. 
II.  WAIVER OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 
Currently, there are three different degrees of review of waivers of federal 
employment rights.  A close examination of the oversight mandated before 
waivers are valid reveals that employees whose FMLA rights have been 
violated are afforded the least amount of protection when an employer seeks to 
have employees waive their rights. 
A. Waiver of Fair Labor Standard Act Rights 
The most restrictive waiver rules apply when employees are waiving their 
rights under the FLSA.  The FLSA was enacted in 1938 for the purpose of 
protecting workers from “substandard wages and oppressive working 
hours.”112  In addition to mandating a minimum wage for covered employees, 
the FLSA requires that covered employees be paid overtime wages for each 
hour worked in excess of forty hours per workweek.113  Congress, recognizing 
the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, made the 
FLSA’s provisions mandatory.114  However, when Congress enacted the 
FLSA, it did not address whether employees’ rights under the statute could be 
waived.  This question was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil seven years after enactment of the statute.115 
Brooklyn involved the claims of workers who were not paid their wages in 
a timely manner as required by the FLSA.116  The specific issue addressed by 
the Court with respect to two of the consolidated cases was “whether an 
employee subject to the terms of the [FLSA] can waive or release his right to 
receive from his employer liquidated damages under § 16 (b).”117  In one case, 
the employee signed “a release of all of his rights under the [FLSA].”118  In the 
 
 111. See, e.g., Jessica Snorgrass, Comment, Waiving the Effectiveness of the FMLA: The Anti-
Waiver Approach to Enforceability of FMLA Severance Agreement Waivers, 45 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 163, 179 (2008). 
 112. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981); see also Tenn. 
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (The FLSA was 
enacted to protect “the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their 
freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.”). 
 113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1) (2006). 
 114. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 707. 
 115. Id. at 699. 
 116. Id. at 700–02. 
 117. Id. at 699. 
 118. Id. at 700. 
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second consolidated case involving the waiver issue, the employee signed a 
“general release of all claims.”119 
In addressing the issue of the waivability of FLSA rights, the Court 
concluded that based on the policy considerations, an individual employee’s 
statutory entitlements under the FLSA, i.e., right to a minimum wage and to 
overtime pay, are not subject to negotiation or bargaining between employers 
and employees.120  After stating the general proposition that “a statutory right 
conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be 
waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory 
policy,”121 the Court concluded that the “attempted release and waiver of rights 
under the Act [through the signing of the release] was absolutely void.”122  The 
Court reaffirmed this holding a year later in D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi.123  
Thus, while Congress did not explicitly state that employees’ rights afforded 
under the FLSA may not be waived, the Supreme Court concluded that 
statutory entitlements under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or 
otherwise waived because it would “nullify the purposes of the statute and 
thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”124 
B. Waiver of Title VII Rights 
Employers also seek to have employees waive their rights provided under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII was enacted twenty-six 
years after the enactment of the FLSA.125  In contrast to the FLSA, which set 
forth minimum labor standards, Title VII addressed invidious discrimination in 
employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.126  
However, like the FLSA, the original statutory and regulatory language did not 
address the waivability of Title VII rights.  The issue of the waivability of 
rights under Title VII arose ten years after its enactment in the case of 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.127 
Gardner-Denver addressed the issue of whether an employee was 
precluded from bringing a Title VII action when his claims were adjudicated in 
binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.128  The Court 
 
 119. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 701–02. 
 120. Id. at 706–07. 
 121. Id. at 704. 
 122. Id. at 713–14. 
 123. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1946) (noting that employees 
generally may not waive their right to wages or liquidated damages). 
 124. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 126. Id. 
 127. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 128. Id. at 43. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] A NEXT STEP IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 21 
concluded that the submission, adjudication, and resolution of a claim of 
discrimination under the procedures provided for under the collective 
bargaining agreement did not amount to the employee waiving his rights to 
pursue his claims under Title VII in a court of law.129  Although the case did 
not involve a situation in which the employee signed a waiver or general 
release, the Court noted that “presumably an employee may waive his cause of 
action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement”130 provided “the 
employee’s consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing.”131  The 
Court did not specifically address whether such a waiver required supervision 
by the courts or the associated administrative agency.  However, that the Court 
only noted one requirement, i.e., that the waiver be “voluntary and knowing,” 
suggests that the Court did not view waivers of Title VII claims in the same 
manner as waivers of rights under the FLSA, which required court or DOL 
approval.  Indeed, Gardner-Denver is frequently cited for the proposition that 
waiver of Title VII claims need not be supervised.132 
The distinction between the agencies charged with enforcing the FLSA and 
Title VII may also explain the difference in treatment of waivers.  As noted 
above, the DOL is tasked with the enforcement of the FLSA.133  The DOL has 
the authority to adjudicate claims and impose administrative sanctions against 
 
 129. Id. at 52. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 52 n.15. 
 132. In promulgating the rule allowing for unsupervised waivers of ADEA claims, the EEOC 
stated the following: 
[T]he Commission has taken into consideration the fact that courts have consistently 
recognized that Congress has expressed a strong preference for voluntary settlements of 
employment discrimination claims and that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e et seq., permits employers and employees to settle disputes by using waiver 
agreements as long as the waiver of rights and release of potential liability is “knowing 
and voluntary.”  Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981).  There is 
a similar preference for voluntary resolution of disputes under the ADEA.  See 29 U.S.C. 
626(d) (efforts at conciliation, conference, and persuasion to be made before resort to 
litigation).  The Supreme Court has noted that Title VII and the ADEA share a common 
purpose and that similar provisions should be similarly interpreted.  Oscar Mayer & Co. 
v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979). 
 This conclusion is supported by section 2(b) of the ADEA which firmly establishes 
the goal of encouraging “employers and workers [to] find ways of meeting problems 
arising from the impact of age on employment.”  29 U.S.C. 621(b).  Moreover, the 
framers of the Act were concerned that delay would prejudice the claims of older workers 
and one of their central goals was to insure expeditious resolution of disputes.  See 113 
Cong. Rec. 7076 (Remarks of Sen. Javits) Burns v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 696 
F.2d 21, 24 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982). 
Legislative Regulation and Administrative Exemption Allowing for Non-EEOC Supervised 
Waivers Under the ADEA, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293, 32,294 (Aug. 27, 1987). 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2006). 
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employers it has determined violated the FLSA.134  Title VII, on the other 
hand, is enforced by the EEOC.135  The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964136 and was given the authority to basically investigate and 
conciliate charges of discrimination made by employees.137  It was not until 
1972 when Congress amended Title VII that the EEOC was provided with 
additional authority to institute civil actions against employers the Commission 
concluded had violated Title VII.138  However, Congress did not provide the 
EEOC with direct powers to adjudicate claims or impose administrative 
sanctions similar to the authority provided to the DOL.139  Thus, it would have 
been difficult at the time the Court decided Gardner-Denver to also provide for 
only supervised waivers when the EEOC did not have the same authority over 
employers as the DOL had when reviewing FLSA violations. 
C. Waiver of ADEA Rights 
Employees are also often asked to waive their rights under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).  The ADEA was enacted in 
1967 to address age discrimination of individuals forty years old or older, in 
the terms and conditions of their employment, including hiring, job retention, 
and compensation.140  Like the other federal employment statutes, Congress 
did not initially address the waivability of ADEA claims.  However, some 
courts and commentators argued that because the ADEA incorporated portions 
of the FLSA,141 waiver of ADEA claims required approval from the 
enforcement agency (in the case of the ADEA, that would be the EEOC142) or 
 
 134. Id. § 216. 
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).  
 136. Id. § 2000e-4(a). 
 137. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 671, 672–73 (2005). 
 138. Id. at 677. 
 139. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (“[F]inal responsibility for 
enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts.  The Act authorizes courts to issue 
injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy the effects 
of unlawful employment practices.”); see Occhialino & Vail, supra note 137, at 677. 
 140. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
 141. Section 626(b) provides that “[t]he provisions of [the ADEA] shall be enforced in 
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in [the FLSA].”  Id. § 626(b). 
 142. Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Document or 
Agreement Alleged to Constitute Private, Individual Release of Claim Under Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USCS §§ 621–634), 88 A.L.R. FED. 412, § 2 (1988) 
(“Enforcement was originally the responsibility of the Secretary of Labor, but in 1978 was 
transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).”). 
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the court, the same as the waiver requirement for FLSA claims.143  Others 
disagreed,144 and in 1986, an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit decided 
Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., and held that waivers of ADEA 
claims, like waivers of Title VII claims, did not require court or agency 
approval to be valid.145  Several circuits followed146 and the EEOC 
promulgated a regulation authorizing unsupervised waivers of ADEA 
claims.147 
Following the Runyan decision and issuance of the EEOC regulation, 
Congress, concerned about unrestricted waivers of ADEA claims,148 amended 
the ADEA by adding a subsection relating specifically to the wavier of ADEA 
claims.149  Congress required the following: (1) the waiver must be written in 
language that an average employee would understand;150 (2) the waiver must 
include a specific reference to waiver of claims arising under the ADEA;151 (3) 
the waiver cannot include claims that arise after the date the waiver is 
signed;152 (4) the employer must provide consideration in addition to any 
normal retirement benefit package;153 (5) the employer must advise the 
employee in writing to consult with an attorney before signing the waiver;154 
(6) the employee must be given at least twenty-one days to decide whether to 
sign the waiver;155 and (7) the employee must have the opportunity to revoke 
the agreement within seven days of its execution.156  Congress also placed the 
burden of proof on the employer to establish the validity of a waiver.157 
 
 143.  Judith Droz Keyes & Douglas J. Farmer, Settlement of Age Discrimination Claims—The 
Meaning and Impact of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 12 LAB. LAW. 261, 263 
(1996). 
 144. Id. 
 145. 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
 146. Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 264. 
 147. Legislative Regulation and Administrative Exemption Allowing for Non-EEOC 
Supervised Waivers Under the ADEA, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293 (Aug. 27, 1987) (codified at 29 
C.F.R. § 1627). 
 148. Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 264–67 (discussing congressional response to 
Runyan and EEOC regulation authorizing unsupervised waiver). 
 149. Act of Oct. 16, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §201, 104 Stat. 978, 983–84 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 626(f) (2006)). 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A). 
 151. Id. § 626(f)(1)(B). 
 152. Id. § 626(f)(1)(C). 
 153. Id. § 626(f)(1)(D). 
 154. Id. § 626(f)(1)(E). 
 155. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(i). 
 156. Id. § 626(f)(1)(G). 
 157. Id. § 626(f)(3). 
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While waivers of ADEA claims do not require the same degree of 
oversight as waivers of claims under the FLSA, more is required than of 
waivers of Title VII and FMLA claims. 
III.  WAIVER OF FMLA RIGHTS SHOULD REQUIRE COURT OR AGENCY 
APPROVAL 
As noted above, courts were split on the issue of whether waivers of 
FMLA claims required court or DOL approval to be valid.158  However, when 
the DOL amended section 825.220(d) judicial disagreement became irrelevant, 
and employers may now secure “release of FMLA claims by employees based 
on past employer conduct without the approval of the Department of Labor or 
a court.”159 
As a result of the DOL’s amendment, waivers of FMLA rights are 
essentially afforded the least amount of protection of all of the employment 
statutes.  FMLA waivers do not require preapproval like the FLSA or the 
satisfaction of additional statutory waiver requirements like the ADEA.  
Although the rules governing FMLA waivers appear identical to waivers of 
Title VII rights, a close examination reveals that in actuality employees who 
waive their Title VII claims are afforded more protection than employees who 
waive their FMLA claims. 
The astonishing ease in which employers can secure waivers of FMLA 
rights undercuts the underlying purpose of the FMLA and thus, threatens the 
job security the statute was designed to provide.  Moreover, the current FMLA 
waiver rules ignore the significant differences between the FMLA and 
discrimination statutes like Title VII. 
A. Unsupervised Waivers Undercut the Purpose of the FMLA 
Like the FLSA, the FMLA was enacted to set minimum labor standards.  
While the FLSA’s focus is on minimum labor standards in the area of pay,160 
the FMLA’s focus is on minimum labor standards in the area of sick leave and 
was enacted to address “inadequate job security for employees who have 
serious health conditions that prevent them from working for temporary 
periods.”161  Moreover, the FMLA was “based on the same principle as the 
child labor laws, the minimum wage, Social Security, the safety and health 
 
 158. See supra Part I.C. 
 159. 29 C.F.R. 825.220(d) (2010); see supra Part I.D. 
 160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1) (2006). 
 161. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4) (2006). 
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laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other labor laws that establish 
minimum standards for employment.”162 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court held that the FLSA statutory 
minimum labor standard entitlements, which affected the public interest, could 
not be waived or released because “such waiver or release contravenes the 
statutory policy.”163  Moreover, the Court has held that statutory entitlements 
under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because 
this would “nullify the purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative 
policies it was designed to effectuate.”164  Because the FLSA and the FMLA 
both establish minimum labor standards, the same policy reasons that 
supported the employers in Brooklyn not being able to avoid their obligations 
and responsibilities under the FLSA support the conclusion that employees’ 
FMLA rights and entitlements should not be able to be bargained away.  
 
 162. H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 21–22 (1993).  The child labor laws, the minimum wage, 
Social Security, the safety and health laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other labor 
laws that establish minimum standards for employment all 
arose in response to specific problems with broad implications.  The minimum wage was 
enacted because of the societal interest in preventing the payment of exploitative wages.  
Children worked for long hours, under unsafe conditions, before the child labor laws were 
enacted.  The Social Security Act was based on the belief that workers should be assured 
a minimum pension at retirement.  The Occupational Safety and Health Act created 
standards to help assure safe and healthy workplaces. 
. . . . 
 There is a common set of principles underlying these labor standards.  In each 
instance, a Federal labor standard directly addressed a serious societal problem, such as 
the exploitation of child labor, or the exposure of workers to unsafe working conditions.  
Voluntary corrective actions on the part of employers had proven inadequate, with 
experience failing to substantiate the claim that, left alone, all employers would act 
responsibly.  Finally, each law was enacted with the needs of employers in mind. Care 
was taken to establish standards that employers could meet. 
 It is a minority of employers who act irresponsibly.  Even without minimum 
standards most employers would pay a living wage, take steps to protect the health and 
safety of their work force, and offer their employees decent benefits.  A central reason that 
labor standards are necessary is to relieve the competitive pressure placed on responsible 
employers by employers who act irresponsibly.  Federal labor standards take broad 
societal concerns out of the competitive process so that conscientious employers are not 
forced to compete with unscrupulous employers. 
 The FMLA was drafted with these principles in mind and fits squarely within the 
tradition of the labor standards laws that have preceded it.  In the past, Congress has 
responded to changing economic realities by enacting labor standards that are now widely 
accepted.  In drawing on this tradition, the FMLA proposes a minimum labor standard to 
address significant new developments in today’s workplace. 
Id. 
 163. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, at 704 (1945). 
 164. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Allowing the bargaining away of the rights that serve the public interest will 
allow employers to avoid the statutory minimum labor standard entitlements 
that Congress concluded was in the public interest to codify. 
B. The Significant Differences Between the FMLA and Title VII Compel 
Stricter Treatment of FMLA Waivers 
Not only does the purpose of the FMLA support stricter FMLA waiver 
requirements, but the many significant differences between the FMLA and 
Title VII compel stricter treatment of waivers of FMLA claims. 
1. Familiarity with the Law 
Generally, when courts are determining the validity of an employee’s 
signed release which waives his or her rights under federal employment 
statutes, the courts look to see if the waiver of rights was “knowing and 
voluntary.”165  It goes without saying that the more an employee understands 
the rights afforded under a particular federal employment statute, the greater 
the chance that the employee’s unsupervised waiver of those rights will be 
“knowing and voluntary.”  The corollary then is that the less an employee 
understands about a particular federal employment statute, the lower the 
chance that an unsupervised waiver of the rights afforded under that statute 
will be “knowing and voluntary.”  These propositions underscore the problem 
with treating waivers of FMLA claims in the same manner as waivers of Title 
VII claims. 
Title VII was enacted in 1964, and since that time, employees have 
become very familiar with the rights provided under Title VII.166  The general 
public fully understands that Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to 
discriminate in employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex and 
national origin.  More than 50,000 Title VII charges of discrimination have 
been filed each year during the last decade.167  More than 68,000 Title VII 
charges of discrimination were filed during the 2009 fiscal year.168  Thousands 
of lawsuits have been filed, many of which have involved high profile cases.  
Because employees understand and are familiar with Title VII, employees 
easily recognize those situations when an employer may be engaging in 
 
 165. Craig Robert Senn, Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of Federal Employment Claims: 
Replacing the Totality of Circumstances Test with a “Waiver Certainty” Test, 58 FLA. L. REV. 
305, 310 (2006) (discussing the “knowing and voluntary” standard for waiver of federal 
employment claims). 
 166. See Robert M. Weems, Selected Issues and Trends in Civil Litigation in Mississippi 
Federal District Courts, 77 MISS. L.J. 977, 1021 (2008) (noting that Title VII is the “most 
familiar” of all of the federal antidiscrimination statutes). 
 167. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/sta 
tistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
 168. Id. 
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conduct in violation of Title VII.  This understanding and familiarity allow 
employees the ability to waive their rights without the necessity of oversight or 
approval by the courts or the EEOC. 
In contrast to Title VII, the FMLA, which has been in force less than 
twenty years, is still a mystery to many.169  Most employees are still unfamiliar 
with the specific rights afforded under the statute.170  The number of FMLA 
claims filed with the DOL each year is but a fraction of the number of Title VII 
claims filed with EEOC each year.171  While the differences in the number of 
claims filed can be explained in part by the unique protections provided under 
the statutes, the differences in numbers also suggest that employees are not as 
familiar with their rights under the FMLA as they are with their rights under 
Title VII. 
Compounding the problem of lack of familiarity is that releases often do 
not specifically mention the FMLA, even though most releases do explicitly 
identify Title VII claims as claims being released.172  When employees are 
unfamiliar with the rights afforded under the FMLA and the release does not 
make specific reference to the fact that FMLA claims are being released, the 
employees are not provided a fair opportunity to “knowingly and voluntarily” 
waive their rights.  If supervision of the FMLA waiver was mandated, there 
would be assurances that the employees were adequately informed before 
relinquishing their FMLA entitlements. 
2. Context in Which Waivers Arise 
Another key difference between the FMLA and Title VII is the context in 
which waivers of actual claims arise.  As discussed above, most employees are 
familiar with the prohibitions of Title VII.  That being the case, when an 
employee is not hired, not promoted, terminated, or subjected to some other 
adverse employment action and the employee believes the adverse action was 
because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the employee 
will often take immediate steps to address his or her concern that the employer 
 
 169. See Beverly A. Block, The Reality of FMLA and Parental Leave, LAW. J., Sept. 12, 
2008, at 7 (noting that lawyers and non-lawyers alike are unfamiliar with the provisions of the 
FMLA). 
 170. Id. 
 171. According to the most recent DOL figures, 1889 FMLA complaints were filed with the 
DOL in 2008.  2008 Statistics Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 6 (Dec. 2008), http://www.dol. 
gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf.  Compare this to the almost 70,000 Title VII charges filed 
in 2008.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, supra note 167.  2009 FMLA figures 
are not yet available. 
 172. Even when the release failed to make specific reference to the FMLA, at least one court 
found that FMLA claims were waived where the release contained a general catch-all provision.  
See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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has violated Title VII.173  Thus, the vast majority of Title VII actions and the 
accompanying settlements arise out of individual challenges to employer 
conduct as opposed to mass layoff situations.174 
While some FMLA challenges to employer actions arise in independent 
individual situations as well,175 anecdotal evidence appears to suggest that 
many FMLA claims and waiver issues arise in the context of a mass reduction 
in force.176  Such was the situation in the Taylor case. 
In Taylor, the plaintiff received a poor productivity evaluation when her 
employer, in violation of the FMLA, counted her FMLA-qualifying leave 
against her.177  The plaintiff was then selected for the reduction in force 
because of her evaluation.178  As the Taylor case demonstrates, FMLA issues 
may not arise or become evident until a mass layoff or reduction in force 
occurs.  When large numbers of employees are being terminated and are being 
provided with the same standard release, employees with actual FMLA 
violation issues may find it difficult to give their FMLA claims the 
individualized attention they would receive if the issues arose in an individual 
situation. 
These types of waiver concerns in mass layoff situations were also present 
in ADEA cases.  Indeed, Congress enacted the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act (“OWBPA”) out of concern that individuals would waive their 
ADEA rights in a mass layoff scenario without fully appreciating the rights 
they were abandoning.179  So too should employees waiving their FMLA rights 
be afforded greater waiver protections, especially in mass layoff situations.  
And again, the best method to ensure that employees give the waiver of their 
FMLA claims adequate attention is to require supervised waivers. 
3. Economic Duress 
The economic reality facing employees with FMLA claims also supports 
stricter control of FMLA waivers.  While any employee who is facing loss of 
employment will be confronted with financial hardship, individuals who 
utilized or sought to utilize their FMLA rights are often in a more difficult 
economic situation than those waiving rights afforded under Title VII and the 
other federal employment statutes.  This is because employees who have 
 
 173. See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 266. 
 175. See, e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 176. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995) 
(Employers and employer advocates raised concerns regarding the non-waiverability of the 
FMLA as provided in the original section 825.220(d) and impact the rule would have on early 
retirement programs.). 
 177. Taylor I, 415 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 178. Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 365–67. 
 179. Id. at 264–65. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] A NEXT STEP IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 29 
utilized their rights under the FMLA have, by nature of the rights afforded 
under the statute, required leave from their job to address either their own or a 
family member’s serious health condition.180  Moreover, serious health issues 
often result in significant medical bills.  Thus, these employees often find 
themselves in a tight financial situation due to health care costs and the 
exhaustion of paid sick leave.181  When faced with a release accompanying the 
termination of their employment, these employees must decide between 
signing a release and receiving a modest severance and limited continuation of 
benefits during a time of financial crisis or refusing to sign the release and 
receiving no severance or continuation of health benefits following their 
termination. 
Most employees in such a situation will have no choice but to sign the 
severance agreement in order to, at least in the short term, continue to provide 
for their families.  The superior position of employers over employees facing 
economic turmoil due to health-related issues underscores the need for 
supervised waivers in FMLA cases, particularly in mass-layoff situations. 
4. Greater Consequences When FMLA Claims Are Waived 
When an employee waives a viable claim under the FMLA via a release 
when his employment is being terminated, an often underappreciated 
consequence results—the employee will not be covered under the FMLA again 
until that employee has been employed with a covered employer for at least 
one year.182  This is in stark contrast to waivers of claims of any of the other 
employment statutes.  If an employee waives his rights under Title VII, the 
ADEA, or even the FLSA, the employee is afforded the protection of those 
statutes immediately upon securing other employment with a covered 
employer.  The waiving of an FMLA claim in the same context will not only 
affect the employee’s ability to prosecute the employer’s FMLA violation, but 
it will affect the employee’s ability to be covered under the Act for at least a 
year.183  It is not hard to imagine that many employees would fail to fully 
appreciate this consequence when faced with termination and a release that 
will provide temporary compensation and benefits.  And when employees do 
not fully appreciate what they are foregoing in releasing their FMLA claims, 
they are not able to properly assess whether the consideration offered in 
 
 180. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).  The FMLA also provides for leave following the birth or 
adoption of a child.  Id.  These cases do not generally result in a violation of the FMLA because 
employers by in large are accustomed to providing maternity and paternity leave. 
 181. The FMLA provides for 12 weeks of unpaid leave.  Id. § 2612(a)(1), (c).  So, unless the 
employer provides for paid sick leave, employees who utilize their FMLA leave have job 
protection upon their return, id. § 2614(a)(1), but not income during their leave period. 
 182. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (2010). 
 183. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a). 
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exchange for their release is adequate.  In determining the adequacy of the 
consideration, the employee should consider the available FMLA leave under 
the employee’s current employment, the ability to promptly secure new 
employment so the employee could begin accumulating time toward the one-
year employment prerequisite, and the need for FMLA leave in the future.  
Because in reduction-in-force scenarios employers usually provide the same 
severance amount or use the same severance formula when paying terminated 
employees in exchange for the employees’ agreement to release employment 
claims, the severance amounts are not adequate consideration when an 
employee is waiving a viable FMLA claim, particularly when the employee is 
also giving up protection under the statute for no less than a year.  In such an 
unequal bargaining situation, the need for review of waivers is obvious. 
C. Requiring Supervised Waivers of FMLA Claims Will Not Reduce the 
Number of FMLA Settlements or Unduly Burden the Process 
Many proponents of unsupervised waivers of FMLA claims cite to the 
policy favoring settlement of employment claims.  Indeed, the courts and 
Congress have repeatedly expressed the preference that employment claims be 
resolved via voluntary settlement by the parties.184 
However, requiring supervised waivers of FMLA claims will not 
necessarily reduce the number of voluntary settlements.  Requiring supervised 
settlements will simply provide employees who are waiving their rights with 
relevant information from which they can make a “knowing and voluntary” 
decision.  It bears noting that despite having the requirement of supervised 
settlement, most FLSA claims are resolved by settlement rather than 
litigation.185  The supervised waiver requirement under the FLSA is not meant 
to decrease the number of voluntary settlements; rather, the supervision is 
intended to ensure that employers are not thwarting the purpose of the statute 
by securing waivers of employees’ entitlements under the statute. 
Furthermore, requiring supervised FMLA waivers will not unduly burden 
the DOL or the courts as some have argued.  Employers are able to identify 
those situations in which significant FMLA liability risks are present.  Not 
every employee is eligible for FMLA leave.186  Not every eligible employee 
requires or seeks FMLA leave.  Not every employee who seeks FMLA leave is 
 
 184. See Daniel P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray: The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard 
for Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
73, 110 (2005). 
 185. Bonetti v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (explaining 
that “[m]ost FLSA cases now generally settle early-on in the litigation process”). 
 186. Employees are eligible if they have worked for a covered employer for at least 12 
months and worked 1250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the start of 
the leave.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110. 
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denied the requested leave.  Thus, the employer should not have a difficult 
time identifying those situations where a risk of FMLA liability exists.187 
Moreover, the potential risk of an FMLA violation by an employer is far 
less than the potential risk of an FLSA violation.  Indeed, the DOL’s 
enforcement numbers bear this out.  In fiscal year 2008, the Wage and Hour 
Division of the Department of Labor collected more than $185 million in back 
wages for 228,645 employees.188  Of those employees, more than 197,000 
were employees with minimum wage and overtime back wage violations.189  In 
contrast, only 1,082 of the 228,645 employees who received back wages had 
FMLA violation cases.190  Based on these enforcement numbers, employers 
have a much greater risk of violating the FLSA than violating the FMLA. 
Because of the low risk of FMLA liability and the employers’ ability to 
identify those situations where risk of liability exists, employers will continue 
to handle severance and settlement agreements as they have in the past, i.e., 
seeking DOL or court approval only in those rare instances where significant 
FLSA or FMLA liability exists. 
Additionally, both the courts and the DOL are equipped to handle requests 
for approval when such approval is required because both entities have 
processes in place by which to supervise settlements of FMLA claims.  With 
respect to the DOL, the Secretary supervises FMLA settlements in the same 
manner as the Secretary supervises settlements under the FLSA.191  With 
respect to the courts, where an FMLA case is pending before the court, there is 
nothing in the legislative or regulatory scheme that would prevent the court 
from approving settlements in the same manner as it approves FLSA 
settlements. 
If waivers of FMLA rights required approval, two things would occur.  
First, employers would take steps to ensure that employees’ rights have not 
been violated, and second, employees would be fully informed of the effects of 
 
 187. In its supplemental brief filed during the Fourth Circuit review of Taylor v. Progress 
Energy, Inc., the employer acknowledged that 
[w]hen employers and employees enter into severance or settlement agreements, they 
rarely seek DOL approval of the release of FLSA claims because the risk exposure from 
unreleased minimum wage and overtime compensation claims is limited and employers 
can identify those situations in which significant liability risks are present and limit their 
approval requests to such situations. 
Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 11, Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525), 
2006 WL 2432028. 
 188. 2008 Statistics Fact Sheet, supra note 171, at 1. 
 189. Id. at 2. 
 190. Id. at 7. 
 191. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1) (directing the DOL to resolve FMLA complaints in the same 
manner it resolves complaints under the FLSA—in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 216). 
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waiving their rights before waiving them.  The end result would be a statute 
that ensures basic job security when it comes to employees’ health care issues. 
IV.  CHANGING AND CHALLENGING THE FMLA NON-SUPERVISION OF WAIVER 
RULE 
Although, as discussed above, there are very strong arguments supporting 
the requirement that FMLA waivers be supervised, such is not the case under 
the current law.192  Employees and advocates who want to ensure that 
employees who waive their FMLA rights do so only after being fully and 
adequately informed through supervised waivers may advocate for executive, 
legislative, and judicial actions to modify the existing law. 
A. Executive and Legislative Options 
During the last months of the prior president’s administration, a number of 
regulatory amendments were proposed.  When regulation changes take place 
during a change in the administration, the new executive often takes steps to 
halt the amendment process.  Indeed, President Obama, in one of his first acts 
as President, ordered federal agencies to “[w]ithdraw from the [Office of the 
Federal Register] all proposed or final regulations that have not been 
published” to allow his administration to review them.193  However, the rule 
amending section 825.220(d) was not affected by this order because the final 
rule amending section 825.220(d) was issued on November 17, 2008 and 
became effective January 16, 2009, prior to President Obama taking the oath of 
office on January 20, 2009.194 
The only other option for the Executive is to initiate through the DOL a 
new administrative rulemaking to nullify the previous administration’s 
amendment to section 825.220(d).195  With the economic crisis, high 
unemployment, and the health care crisis, it is no surprise that the 
Administration and the DOL have not had the amendment of section 
825.220(d) as a top priority, especially where the new rulemaking process can 
be time-consuming and costly.196  It appears unlikely that such a rulemaking 
will occur anytime soon. 
 
 192. See supra Part I.D. 
 193. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).  White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel issued the memorandum 
on Tuesday, January 20, 2009.  Id. 
 194. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
 195. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before 
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 592 (2003). 
 196. See id. (“[A] new administration wishing to change the policy may face significant costs.  
Just as the outgoing administration initially did in issuing the rule, the new administration usually 
must expend resources on a second full-scale APA notice-and-comment rulemaking, which has 
evolved into a relatively expensive and time-consuming process.  The now-familiar requirements 
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As far as congressional action, Congress had the option of utilizing its 
powers under the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)197 to review the 
amendment to section 825.220(d) when the regulation was first amended.  The 
CRA, in essence, provides Congress with legislative “veto” authority over 
agency rules and might have provided Congress with a means to nullify the 
amendment in an expedited manner.198  However, this Act has not proven to be 
very effective in nullifying agency rules,199 and Congress was apparently 
disinclined to utilize the CRA in this situation. 
Another option is for Congress to pass new legislation.  Indeed, on April 
29, 2009, Congresswomen Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH), along with twenty-four 
cosponsors, introduced bill H.R. 2161, entitled: To Nullify Certain Regulations 
Promulgated Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and Restore 
Prior Regulations and to Direct the Secretary of Labor to Revise Certain 
Additional Regulations Under that Act.200  Representative Shea-Porter 
explained that the purpose of H.R. 2161 was to ”restore the Family and 
Medical Leave Act to its original intent and spirit.”201  Included in the 
proposed revisions is the restoration of section 825.220(d) to its original form, 
which prohibits both the prospective and retrospective waiver of FMLA 
rights.202 
H.R. 2161 was referred to three committees on April 29, 2009—the House 
Education and Labor Committee, the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee, and the House Administration Committee.203  As of this 
writing, none of these committees have reported back to the general body of 
the House of Representatives.  Even though Democrats have at times made up 
the majorities in these committees, it is not surprising that this bill has not 
made it out of committee, as the House has been preoccupied addressing more 
pressing issues, such as the war, healthcare reform, and a failing economy.  
The unfortunate and sobering reality is that it is not likely that this bill will be 
 
include the publication of a detailed proposal, often with extensive supporting analyses, and, after 
public comments have been received, written responses to all significant comments.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 197. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2006). 
 198. Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness, 
17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 371–72 (2008). 
 199. Id. at 372 (noting, that “[i]n the decade following the enactment of the CRA, ‘[a]lmost 
42,000 rules were reported to Congress over that period, including 610 major rules, and only one, 
the Labor Department’s ergonomics standard, was disapproved in March 2001.’” (quoting 10th 
Anniversary of the Congressional Review Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & 
Admin. Law, 109th Cong. 22 (2006))). 
 200. Family and Medical Leave Restoration Act, H.R. 2161, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 201. Legal Alert: Legislation to Revise FMLA Introduced, FORD & HARRISON, LLP (May 11, 
2009), http://www.fordharrison.com/getpdf.aspx?Type=News&ID=4780. 
 202. See H.R. 2161, §2(a)(1). 
 203. 155 CONG. REC. H4998 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2009). 
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signed into law, as the vast majority of bills do not make it out of committee, 
and failure to act by a committee effectively “kills” the bill. 
B. Litigation Options 
Where the executive and legislative options may not be viable, court 
challenges to the regulation and actual waivers may result in meaningful 
change. 
1. Direct Challenges to the Regulation 
One of the most direct ways for employee advocates to change the current 
law is to challenge the legality of the DOL’s amendment.  Advocates would 
essentially argue that the regulation is invalid because it is contrary to 
Congress’ intent. 
When enacting the FMLA, Congress saw fit to not only create statutory 
entitlements related to sick leave, but, as a review of the statutory language and 
legislative history suggests, Congress also intended FMLA rights to be 
afforded the same treatment as FLSA rights.  As previously discussed, the 
waiver restriction on FLSA claims was a judicially-created restriction.204  
Congress, seeing the wisdom in the Court’s 1945 ruling, explicitly added 
language codifying the FLSA supervision requirement in 1949.  In section 
216(c) of the FLSA, Congress authorized the DOL 
to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime 
compensation owing to any employee or employees . . . and the agreement of 
any employee to accept such payment shall upon payment in full constitute a 
waiver by such employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this 
section to such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and 
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.205 
When it enacted the FMLA, Congress specifically directed the DOL to 
resolve the FMLA complaints in the same manner it resolves complaints under 
the FLSA.206  Additionally, both statutes provide for collective actions207 and 
the remedies provided under the FMLA are analogous to the remedies 
provided under the FLSA.208  Congress’ reliance on the well-established FLSA 
 
 204. See supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text. 
 205. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2006). 
 206. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1); see also S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 35 (1993) (“[The FMLA’s] 
enforcement scheme is modeled on the enforcement scheme of the FLSA.”), reprinted in 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 37. 
 207. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). 
 208. See S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 35 (1993) (“The relief provided in FMLA also parallels the 
provisions of the FLSA.”), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 37; see also Jordan v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 379 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004) (looking to the FLSA “for guidance in interpreting 
FMLA damages because of the similarity of the damages provisions”); Arban v. West Publ’g 
Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 407 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his court previously has turned to the Fair Labor 
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enforcement and remedial provisions strongly supports the conclusion that it 
was Congress’ intent that FMLA claims be treated as FLSA claims, including 
the requirement that waivers be supervised to be valid. 
Indeed, the DOL appeared to recognize Congress’ intent when it initially 
promulgated section 825.220(d).  As previously noted, the DOL explicitly 
rejected the employers’ recommendation that the language of the regulation be 
modified to allow waivers and releases of FMLA claims in the same manner as 
Title VII and ADEA claims.209  The DOL stated that it had “concluded that 
prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and employers inducing 
employees to waive their rights constitute sound public policy under the 
FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards statutes such as the 
FLSA.”210 
Because the DOL amendment is contrary to congressional intent, 
advocates should challenge the validity of the amendment in the courts. 
2. Challenges of the Waivers 
Another, and possibly the most viable, option is for employees to challenge 
the waiver of FMLA rights in their individual situations.  As discussed above, 
jurisdictions require that employees “knowingly and voluntarily” waive their 
rights under federal employment statute before the waiver will be enforced 
against them.211  Also discussed was employees’ lack of familiarity with the 
FMLA, particularly when compared to employees’ knowledge of other 
employment statutes.212  Because of the continuing confusion surrounding the 
rights and responsibility under the FMLA, employees should challenge 
waivers on the ground that the waivers were not voluntarily and knowingly 
made in cases where employers secured waivers utilizing releases that did not 
explicitly state that the employees were waiving their rights under the FMLA. 
Employees should also challenge waivers when an employer, who knows, 
or has reason to know, that the employee is entitled to FMLA relief, fails to so 
advise the employee before securing a waiver of the employee’s FMLA rights.  
The FMLA imposes an affirmative duty on employers to advise employees that 
they may be entitled to FMLA leave when the employer receives information 
 
Standards Act (FLSA), which contains similar remedial provisions, for guidance in interpreting 
the FMLA.”); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 968–69 (10th Cir. 
2002) (interpreting FMLA cost provisions in the same way they are interpreted under the FLSA); 
Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Because the FMLA’s link to 
the remedial provisions of the FLSA is stronger than it is to Title VII . . . we rely on case law 
under the FLSA rather than Title VII . . . .”). 
 209. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 210. Supra note 40. 
 211. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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that would indicate that the employee may be entitled to FMLA leave.213  
Section 825.303 provides that “the employee need not expressly assert rights 
under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA” and that “[t]he employer will be 
expected to obtain any additional required information through informal 
means” to determine if the leave request falls under the FMLA.214 
Thus, employers have an affirmative duty under the FMLA to inform 
employees that they are or may be eligible for FMLA protection even if 
employees are not aware of their entitlement.  This affirmative duty on the 
employer to determine if an employee is entitled to FMLA leave recognizes 
that employers are often in a better position than employees to determine 
whether leave requested is FMLA-qualifying leave.  The employer’s 
affirmative duty set forth in sections 825.300 and 825.303 also underscores the 
principle that the employer should not benefit from an employee’s lack of 
understanding or knowledge of the rights afforded under the FMLA. 
This affirmative duty should likewise apply when an employer seeks to 
have an employee waive his or her FMLA rights.  An employer should not be 
allowed to secure a waiver of FMLA rights when the employer is aware or 
should be aware that the employee may be waiving a viable FMLA claim 
without first clearly and explicitly advising the employee of her possible 
entitlement to FMLA rights.  Allowing an employer to secure a waiver of 
FMLA rights when the employer has information which indicates that the 
employee is entitled to utilize rights under the FMLA but fails to so inform the 
employee, not only allows the employer to thwart the purpose of the statute, 
but also fails to produce a waiver that was knowingly and voluntarily given.215  
Thus, employees should challenge waivers when the employer had sufficient 
information to know that the employee was entitled to FMLA coverage, but 
failed to so inform the employee before securing a waiver of the employee’s 
rights under the FMLA. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout history, all three branches of government have recognized the 
importance of the right of individuals to be gainfully employed to support their 
family.  Our government has also recognized that individuals are entitled to 
 
 213. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2010). 
 214. Id. § 825.303(b) (providing the contents of an employee notice for unforeseeable FMLA 
leave); see also id. § 825.302(c) (providing the contents of an employee notice for foreseeable 
FMLA leave). 
 215. Requiring employers to come forward with information related to a possible employment 
claim prior to securing a waiver of employment rights is not unprecedented.  Employers are 
obligated under the ADEA to provide employees with demographic information related to age 
before an employer may secure the employees’ wavier of ADEA rights in mass layoff situation.  
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) (2006). 
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fair treatment in the conditions of employment.  Such fair treatment includes, 
inter alia, the right to a safe working environment, the right not to lose one’s 
job because of gender, race, or age, and the right to fair compensation.  The 
principles of fairness also dictate that an employee who has worked for one 
year or more for an employer should not lose her job simply because a serious 
health condition causes that employee to miss work for a short period of time.  
Congress affirmed the fairness and rightness of job security in the face of 
health issues when it enacted the FMLA.  Principles of fairness then also 
require that employers not be allowed to secure a waiver of FMLA rights from 
an employee without that employee having given the waiver of her FMLA 
rights thoughtful and deliberate consideration.  And, the only way to ensure a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of FMLA rights is to require approval of 
waivers of FMLA claims by the courts or the DOL.  Indeed, this is what 
Congress intended when it enacted the FMLA and what the DOL intended 
when it promulgated the FMLA waiver regulation.  Now with the country 
being confronted with massive job losses and inadequate health care, hopefully 
the President, Congress, and the judiciary will take steps to ensure that the 
rights afforded employees under the FMLA are not stripped away with the use 
of unsupervised waivers. 
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